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RICO AND THE COURTS: AN "ENTERPRISING"
ATTEMPT TO REACH RACKETEERING
ACTIVITIES
I.

INTRODUCTION

Nearly ten years ago Congress enacted the controversial Organized
Crime Control Act of 1970.' Its purpose was the "eradication of
organized crime in the United States." 2 The proponents of the statute
asserted that strong measures were necessary to battle a force which
had "penetrated into the very roots of American life and society" 3
resulting in a "stranglehold of our citizens."' Although the opponents
generally favored such legislation, many, like the American Civil
Liberties Union, believed that the Act went beyond the goal of
destroying the power of organized crime and made "drastic incursions
on the civil liberties of everyone." ' The Act was further attacked as
running "counter to the letter and spirit of the Constitution" 6 and
containing "the seeds of official repression."'
The concerns expressed by the opponents have perhaps survived
only as they relate to title IX of the OCCA.' Title IX is entitled
"Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations." 9 RICO prohibits
the operation or acquisition of, or the acquisition of an interest in,
through a pattern of racketeering activity, any enterprise engaged in interstate commerce.' 0 Provisions are made for criminal sanctions l as
1. Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922
(codified in scattered titles of U.S.C.) [hereinafter referred to as the OCCA].
2. Id. at 923.
3. Organized Crime Control: Hearings on S. 30, and related proposals, Before
Subcomm. No. 5 of the Comm. on the Judiciary, House of Rep., 91st Cong., 2d Sess.
144 (1970) (statement of Mario Biaggi).
4. Id.
5. Id. at 490 (statement of Lawrence Speiser). Mr. Speiser was Director of the
Washington office of the ACLU. The concerns of the ACLU included: (1) the title I
grant of power to federal grand juries to issue reports and presentments critical of
public employees where there is insufficient evidence to support indictments; (2) the title III authorization of summary confinement of recalcitrant witnesses for up to three
years without bail; (3) the breadth and vagueness of terms such as "scheme to
obstruct" and "gambling business" in title VIII; and (4) the grant of "virtually
unlimited" investigative powers to the government and the breadth of the terms "pattern of racketeering activity" and "collection of unlawful debt" under title IX.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 296 (report by the Committee on Federal Legislation).
8. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1976).
9. [Hereinafter referred to as RICO].
10. 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (1976).
11. Id. § 1963.
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well as civil damages 2 and violators are subject to civil orders of

divestment and dissolution. 3
Since prosecutors began bringing charges under RICO, the courts
have consistently rejected challenges to its constitutionality. ' Not only
have the courts upheld RICO as valid legislation but they have been
willing to construe its provisions liberally in accordance with section

904(a).'1
One such construction has particularly been at issue in the courts.
Of the six circuits to interpret section 1962 of RICO, '6 five have held
12. Id. § 1964.
13. Id.
14. See, e.g., United States v. Elliott, 571 F.2d 880 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 953 (1978); United States v. Campanale, 518 F.2d 352 (9th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 1050 (1976); United States v. Stofsky, 409 F. Supp. 609 (S.D.N.Y.
1973).
In Elliott the court stated that the conviction of a member of an enterprise conspiracy under RICO does not violate the fundamental demand of due process that guilt
be individual and personal. "Congress, in a proper exercise of its legislative power, has
decided that murder, like thefts from interstate commerce and the counterfeiting of
securities, qualifies as racketeering activity. This, of course, ups the ante for RICO
violators who personally would not contemplate taking a human life." 571 F.2d at
905.
An ex post facto claim and a vagueness challenge were rejected by the court in
Campanale. As to the ex post facto claim, the court explained that though one illegal
act forming the "pattern" could take place prior to the effective date of RICO, the second act, without which the "pattern" element of the offense could not be established,
must have been committed subsequent to the October 15, 1970 effective date. The
"pattern," therefore, cannot be committed until after the effective date, thereby
avoiding the prohibition against ex post facto laws. The court dismissed the vagueness
challenge to the terms used in section 1962 by stating that the definitions provided in
section 1961 cure any ambiguity that may otherwise exist. The Stofsky court also rejected a vagueness challenge stating that section 1962(c) "sufficiently places men of
reasonable intelligence on notice that persons employed by the type of enterprise
therein defined cannot resort to a pattern of specified criminal acts in the conduct of
affairs of that enterprise." 409 F. Supp. at 613.
15. Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 904(a), 84 Stat.
922. This section is not codified, however, it is referred to in the notes following section 1961 of 18 U.S.C. Hereinafter all references to RICO provisions will be cited to 18
U.S.C.
Section 904(a) of title IX reads: "The provisions of this title shall be liberally construed to effectuate its remedial purpose."
16. 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (1976). Section 1962 provides:
(a) It shall be unlawful for any person who has received any income derived,
directly or indirectly, from a pattern of racketeering activity or through collection
of an unlawful debt in which such person has participated as a principal within the
meaning of section 2, title 18, United States Code, to use or invest, directly or indirectly, any part of such income, or the proceeds of such income, in acquisition
of any interest in, or the establishment or operation of, any enterprise which is
engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce. A
purchase of securities on the open market for purposes of investment, and
without the intention of controlling or participating in the control of the issuer, or
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that the section not only prohibits the infiltration of legitimate enterprises through a pattern of racketeering activity, but also prohibits
racketeering activity regardless of any involvement with a legitimate
enterprise.' 7 This conclusion is based upon reading the section 1961(4)
definition of "enterprise" to include illegal as well as legal entities.
The result is a prohibition of operating a racketeering "organization"
through a pattern of racketeering.
The Sixth Circuit, in United States v. Sutton,' I was the first court
of appeals to hold that section 1962 may not be applied to persons
engaged in racketeering activity unrelated to any legitimate organization. ' 9 The controversial nature of the issue was emphasized when that
decision, delivered by a three judge panel, was vacated and the case
was set for rehearing before the entire court.2
of assisting another to do so, shall not be unlawful under this subsection if the
securities of the issuer held by the purchaser, the members of his immediate family, and his or their accomplices in any pattern or racketeering activity or the collection of an unlawful debt after such purchase do not amount in the aggregate to
one percent of the outstanding securities of any one class, and do not confer,
either in law or in fact, the power to elect one or more directors of the issuer.
(b) It shall be unlawful for any person through a pattern of racketeering activity
or through collection of an unlawful debt to acquire or maintain, directly or indirectly, any interest in or control of any enterprise which is engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce.
(c) It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any
enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such
enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity or collection of
unlawful debt.
(d) It shall be unlawful for any person to conspire to violate any of the provisions of subsections (a), (b), or (c) of this section.
17. The decisions holding that section 1962 encompasses illegitimate enterprises
include: United States v. Aleman, 609 F.2d 298 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 100 S.Ct.
1345 (1980); United States v. Rone, 598 F.2d 564 (9th Cir. 1979); United States v.
Swiderski, 593 F.2d 1246 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 2055 (1979); United
States v. Malatesta, 583 F.2d 748 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 962 (1979);
United States v. Elliott, 571 F.2d 880 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 953 (1978);
United States v. McLaurin, 557 F.2d 1064 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1020
(1978); United States v. Altese, 542 F.2d 104 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
1039 (1977); United States v. Morris, 532 F.2d 436 (5th Cir. 1976); United States v.
Hawes, 529 F.2d 472 (5th Cir. 1976); United States v. Cappetto, 502 F.2d 1351 (7th
Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 925 (1975).
The only circuit to hold that "enterprise" under section 1962 is limited to legitimate
business was the Sixth Circuit in United States v. Sutton, 605 F.2d 260 (6th Cir. 1979).
That decision, though, was vacated when the court granted a rehearing en banc. See
notes 18 and 20 and accompanying text infra.
18. 605 F.2d 260 (6th Cir. 1979).
19. The only other decision to hold that "enterprise" under RICO is limited to
legitimate business is United States v. Moeller, 402 F. Supp. 49 (D. Conn. 1975). See
note 98 and accompanying text infra.
20. Order Nos. 78-5134-5-6-7-8-9-41-2-3 and 78-5074, United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit (Nov. 7, 1979). The rehearing was scheduled for April, 1980.
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Should the Sixth Circuit again hold that section 1962 violations include only the infiltration of legitimate business by racketeering activity, the resulting split in authority may have far reaching implications.
As RICO is now being applied, the only requirement for obtaining a
conviction under the statute is establishing that the defendants engaged
in a "pattern" of two or more acts made illegal by either federal or
state law. The apparent implication, under this construction, is that
the "enterprise" aspect of the statute is incorporated into the
"racketeering activities" requirement.
The implicit incorporation of "enterprise" into "racketeering activities" creates a statute which duplicates other federal criminal provisions and "federalizes" state crimes. The result is a potent weapon"'
for federal prosecutors to use, not against a different category of
criminals, but against a greater number of them. Acts that were
formerly subject only to state sanctions are now, through RICO,
within the reach of the federal law. 2 Acts that were formerly subject
to specific penalties under federal law can now be penalized more
severely under RICO. 3
21. 18 U.S.C. § 1963 (1976) provides for penalties of up to $25,000 and twenty
years imprisonment for violation of any section 1962 provision. Forfeiture of interest
and property acquired as a result of a section 1962 violation are also provided by section 1963. The government may also take advantage of the civil remedies provided by
section 1964. See note 83 infra. Although the government does not often choose this
option, the option was exercised in United States v. Cappetto, 502 F.2d 1351 (7th Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 925 (1975).
22. Under section 1961(1) "racketeering activity" is defined as including certain
acts which are "chargeable under State law and punishable by imprisonment for more
than one year." 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (1976). If the "enterprise" element is, for practical purposes, incorporated into the "racketeering element," all the government needs
to show to make out a section 1962 violation is one or more persons (enterprise) who
commit at least two specified acts chargeable under state law and punishable by imprisonment for more than one year (racketeering activity) with the requisite impact on
interstate commerce. In discussing the interstate commerce aspect of a section 1962
violation, Judge Van Graafeiland, in his dissenting opinion in United States v. Altese,
stated that "[t]he interstate commerce requirement of § 1962 is likewise unlikely to
greatly confine the scope of federal law enforcement efforts. In criminal statutes containing similar requirements, a de minimis involvement with, or effect on, commerce
has frequently been sufficient." 542 F.2d at 108 (2d Cir. 1976) (Van Graafeiland, J.,
dissenting), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1039 (1977).
23. "Racketeering activity" under section 1961(1) includes acts indictable under
specifically enumerated sections of titles 18 and 29 as well as acts in violation of state
law. Often the penalties for violating RICO section 1962 are greater than if a conviction is obtained under one of the sections included in the section 1961(1) definition.
For example, a gambling business may be indictable under 18 U.S.C. § 1955, if it meets
the statutory requirements and would be subject to a maximum fine of $20,000 and imprisonment of up to five years. Under section 1962 the same gambling business would
be subject to a maximum fine of $25,000 and imprisonment of up to twenty years. Additionally, the government may take advantage of section 1964 civil remedies. See note
83 infra.
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In the event that the Sixth Circuit reaches the same conclusion
about RICO that it initially reached in Sutton, activities made illegal
by state and federal statutes in that circuit will not be encompassed by
RICO unless those activities are involved in the acquisition or operation of a legitimate business. The resulting split of authority in the cir24
cuits would also create an issue ripe for Supreme Court adjudication.
The purpose of this comment is to investigate and analyze the position taken by the majority of courts and the position taken in Sutton
regarding the applicability of RICO to racketeering activities independent of infiltration of legitimate business concerns. Although other
issues surrounding the scope of "enterprise" will be briefly discussed
in section III, the purpose of that discussion will merely be to provide
a perspective on the liberal approach taken by the courts in interpreting RICO.2 5
The sections that follow will discuss the provisions of the OCCA
and RICO, the courts' treatment of RICO, and an analysis of that
treatment. The final section will conclude that, though clearly a
minority view, the Sutton rationale offers a more persuasive argument
as to the intended purpose of RICO.
II.

THE STATUTE

In United States v. Thevis2" the court stated that "[t]he starting
point for analysis of the question presented must be the statute in question, 18 U.S.C. 1961(4).''2 Because this comment will analyze judicial
treatment of "enterprise" as used in RICO sections 1961 and 1962,
and because RICO is but one portion of the OCCA, the starting point
24. See page 379 infra.
25. One case which has proven to be important to the overall development of
RICO interpretation is United States v. Parness, 503 F.2d 430 (2d Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 1105 (1975). Many cases which have held that an "enterprise" under
RICO may be illegitimate have relied on Parness to support their decision. See, e.g.,
United States v. Cappetto, 502 F.2d 1351, 1358 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S.
925 (1975). See note 119 and accompanying text infra. The issue in Parness, however,
was whether the "enterprise" concept in RICO section 1962 includes foreign corporations as well as domestic businesses. The court did not address whether an illegal enterprise is also to be encompassed by section 1962. Apparently Parness is cited for its
statements that section 1962 is to be given a broad construction.
For a discussion of other issues arising under RICO see Atkinson, "Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations, " 18 U.S. C. §§ 1961-68: Broadest of the Federal
Criminal Statutes, 69 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1 (1978). See also Comment,
Organized Crime and the Infiltration of Legitimate Business: Civil Remedies for
"Criminal Activity," 124 U. PA. L. REv. 192 (1975).
26.

474 F. Supp. 134 (N.D. Ga. 1979). The Thevis court held that an "enterprise"

under section 1961(4) includes a "group of individuals associated in fact with various
corporations." Id. at 137.
27. Id. at 138.
Published by eCommons, 1980
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for this analysis will be a broad overview of the OCCA followed by a
more specific look at RICO.
In its statement of findings preceding the text of the OCCA, " 1 Congress indicated that organized crime in the United States is a highly
sophisticated, diversified, and widespread activity which annually
drains billions of dollars from America's economy and derives much
of its power through money obtained from syndicated gambling, loan
sharking, the theft and fencing of property, and the importation and
distribution of narcotics and other dangerous drugs. Congress further stated that the money from these illegal activities was being increasingly used to infiltrate and corrupt legitimate business and labor
unions. This activity was perceived as weakening the stability of the
nation's economic system, harming innocent investors and competing
organizations, interfering with free competition, seriously burdening
interstate and foreign commerce, threatening domestic security and
undermining the general welfare of the nation and its citizens. Finally,
Congress found that organized crime continues to grow because of
defects in the evidence-gathering process of the law and the limited
scope and impact of sanctions and remedies available to the government.
The purpose of the OCCA was stated to be the "eradication of
organized crime in the United States by strengthening the legal tools in
the evidence gathering process, by establishing new penal prohibitions,
with
and by providing enhanced sanctions and new remedies to deal
29
the unlawful activities of those engaged in organized crime."
The statements of findings and purpose indicate that Congress intended to provide new and more effective measures to combat what
was seen to be a major economic, social, and political threat. Each of
the thirteen titles attempts to effectuate the purpose by addressing an
aspect of the findings.
Titles I through VI, for example, attempt to make the prosecutorial
process more "sophisticated" and "widespread" by establishing
special grand juries in major population centers to deal specifically
with organized crime activity,3 0 by providing immunity and protected
facilities for witnesses and their families,3" and by authorizing civil
contempt commitment for recalcitrant witnesses. 2 Title VII attempts
28. See note 1 supra.
29. See note 2 supra.
30. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3331-3334 (1976).
31. Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, §§ 501-504, 84
Stat. 922 (not codified in the U.S.C.).
32. 28 U.S.C. § 1826 (1976).
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol5/iss2/6
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to cure the defects in the evidence-gathering process of the law by
allowing liberal admissibility of government evidence." Titles VIII and
XI are directed at specific organized crime activities: syndicated gamb3 5 Extended sentences for
ling3 ' and transporting explosives.
"dangerous adult special offenders" are authorized under Title X,
thereby broadening the "scope and impact" of sanctions available to
the government.3"
The remaining finding deals with the infiltration and corruption of
legitimate business and labor unions. The remaining title is RICO.
RICO is divided into four sections. Section 1961 contains definitions," the most important of which, for this analysis, are "racket33. 18 U.S.C. § 3503 (1976).
34. Id. §§ 1511, 1955.
35. Id. §§ 841-848.
36. See note 2 supra.
37. Section 1961 provides:
As used in this chapter(1) 'Racketeering activity' means (A) any act or threat involving murder, kidnaping [sic], gambling, arson, robbery, bribery, extortion, or dealing in narcotic
or other dangerous drugs, which is chargeable under State law and punishable by
imprisonment for more than one year; (B) any act which is indictable under any of
the following provisions of title 18, United States Code: Section 201 (relating to
bribery), section 224 (relating to sports bribery), sections 471, 472, and 473
(relating to counterfeiting), section 659 (relating to theft from interstate shipment)
if the act indictable under section 659 is felonious, section 664 (relating to
embezzlement from pension and welfare funds), sections 891-894 (relating to extortionate credit transactions), section 1084 (relating to the transmission of gambling information), section 1341 (relating to mail fraud), section 1343 (relating to
wire fraud), section 1503 (relating to obstruction of justice), section 1510 (relating
to obstruction of criminal investigation), section 1511 (relating to the obstruction
of State or local law enforcement), section 1951 (relating to interference with commerce, robbery, or extortion), section 1952 (relating to racketeering), section 1953
(relating to interstate transportation of wagering paraphenalia), section 1954
(relating to unlawful welfare fund payments), section 1955 (relating to prohibition
of illegal gambling businesses), sections 2314 and 2315 (relating to interstate
transportation of stolen property), sections 2421-24 (relating to white slave
traffic), (C), any act which is indictable under title 29, United States Code, section
186 (dealing with restrictions on payments and loans to labor organizations) or
section 501(c) (relating to embezzlement from union funds), or (D) any offence involving bankruptcy fraud, fraud in the sale of securities, or the felonious
manufacture, importation, receiving, concealment, buying, selling or otherwise
dealing in narcotic or other dangerous drugs, punishable under any law of the
United States ... ;

(3) 'person' includes any individual or entity capable of holding a legal or
beneficial interest in property;
(4) 'enterprise' includes any individual, partnership, corporation, association,
or other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals associated in fact
although not a legal entity;
(5) 'pattern of racketeering activity' requires at least two acts of racketeering activity, one of which occurred after the effective date of this chapter and the last of
Published by eCommons, 1980
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eering activity" and "enterprise." "Racketeering activity" is defined
as including murder, kidnapping, gambling, arson, robbery, bribery,
extortion, narcotics violations, counterfeiting, usury, mail fraud, fraud
connected with a case under title 11,38 securities fraud and obstruction
of justice.3 9 The listing includes generically designated state offenses
and federal offenses designated by reference to specific provisions of
titles 18 and 29 of the United States Code.'" "Pattern of racketeering
activity" is defined as requiring at least "two acts of racketeering activity."' One of the acts must have occurred after October 15, 1970;
the second act must have occurred within ten years of the first.' 2 The
statute defines "enterprise" as including associations in fact as well as
legally recognized entities such as an individual, partnership, or corporation.' 3
Section 1962 sets forth the prohibited activities under RICO."
Subsection (a) prohibits the investment of funds derived from a pattern of racketeering activity by a principal in the activity in any enterprise engaged in interstate or foreign commerce. An exception is made
for the purchase on the open market of less than one percent of a company's securities where the investor obtains no degree of control.' 5
Subsection (b) prohibits any person from acquiring or maintaining,
through a pattern of racketeering activity, an interest in any enterprise
engaged in interstate or foreign commerce. No one percent limitation
6
is provided as in subsection (a).'
Conducting the affairs of any enterprise through a pattern of
racketeering activity by any person associated with the enterprise is
prohibited by subsection (c).' 7 Subsection (d) makes unlawful a conspiracy to violate any provisions of subsections (a), (b), or (c).' 8
The remaining sections of RICO provide for criminal penalties,'
which occurred within ten years (excluding any period of imprisonment) after the
commission of a prior act of racketeering activity ....
38.

The original text read, "any offense involving bankruptcy fraud ....

"

This

was amended to read, "fraud connected with a case under title 11." Pub. L. No.
95-598, Title III, § 313(g), 92 Stat. 2677 (1978).
39. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (1976).
40. Id.
41. Id. § 1961(5).
42. Id.
43. Id. § 1961(4).
44. See note 16 supra.
45. 18 U.S.C § 1962(a) (1976).

46.

Id. § 1962(b).

47.
48.
49.

Id. § 1962(c).
Id. § 1962(d).
18 U.S.C. § 1963 (1976).
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civil remedies, 0 venue and process, 5 ' expedition of actions,"
evidence, 3 and civil investigative demand."4 These sections, however,
have not received the attention that has been given to sections 1961 and
1962. Initially the constitutionality of RICO sections 1961 and 1962
was frequently challenged, 5" but more recently the major issue has
centered on section 1962 and the activities it does or does not prohibit.
To understand how the courts have resolved this issue as to wholly illegitimate activities, a survey of decisions dealing with other aspects of
the issue is necessary.
III.

JUDICIAL TREATMENT OF RICO

The question of what constitutes a RICO "enterprise" has taken
many forms. Three of these forms are particularly relevant to analyzing the trend of RICO interpretation: (a) ' whether the racketeer infiltrated enterprise must be a domestic business, (b) whether the enterprise must be a private organization, and (c) whether the enterprise
must be a legitimate organization.5 6 Although the focus of this comment is the judicial response to the third question, an overview of the
way the courts have dealt with the first two questions provides some
insight into their liberal approach to the third.
A.

Domestic Business vs. Foreign Business

Only one case has addressed the question of whether the racketeer
infiltrated enterprise must be a domestic business. In United States v.
Parness," the appellants had been convicted under section 1962(b), of
acquiring a corporation in the Netherlands Antilles by way of an
elaborate scheme of theft and deception.5 8 The appellants argued that
50. Id. § 1964.
51. Id. § 1965.
52. Id. § 1966.
53. Id. § 1967.
54. Id. § 1968.
55. See note 14 and accompanying text supra.
56. An implicit sub-issue within (c) is whether the "enterprise" must be distinct
from the "racketeering activities." By holding that the "enterprise" may be an illegitimate organization which exists only to commit "racketeering activities," the
courts essentially merge the two elements of a section 1962 offense. This merger apparently indicates that the elements are not distinct and independent. See discussion in
section IV A infra.
57. 503 F.2d 430 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1105 (1975).
58. The scheme involved the withholding of funds by the appellants that were
needed by the corporation to avoid defaulting on a loan. Appellants advanced purportedly borrowed money to the corporation for the purpose of repaying the loan.
Continuing to withhold the corporation's funds, appellants used the note for the "borrowed" money, secured with a controlling percentage of stock, to divest the owner of
the stock of his interest when the note could not be repaid. Id.
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section 1962(b) did not proscribe the acquisition of foreign business as
a result of criminal activity in the United States. The court relied on
the statutory language and legislative history in holding that the section
prohibits the acquisition of any enterprise, including foreign business,
through a pattern of racketeering activity where the requisite impact
on domestic commerce is shown.
In looking at the statutory language, the court stated that "[slection 1962(b) proscribes the acquisition of 'any interest in or control of
any enterprise which is engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce.' 'Enterprise' is defined in § 1961(4) to
include 'any . . .corporation.' On its face the proscription is all inclusive."II
As an indication of the foreign corporation's impact on domestic
commerce, the court pointed to the American ownership of the Antillean corporation, the financing by American banks, the numerous
domestic creditors, and the primary servicing of American tourists.
These facts prompted the court to "reject out of hand" the contention
that the appellants' corporation did not sufficiently affect interstate

commerce. 60
In looking at legislative history, the court relied on the statement of
findings and purpose of the OCCA which states that "organized crime
activities weaken the stability of the Nation's economic system, harm
innocent investors . . . and undermine the general welfare of the Nation and [American] citizens."" l This evidence was considered to be a
sufficient indication that Congress intended to include foreign corporations within the definition of enterprise.
B.

Public Entities vs. Private Business

The issue in Parness centered on the type of private business encompassed by RICO. Other courts have addressed the question
whether the "enterprise" concept of section 1961(4) includes public entities as well as private business.
The argument that "enterprise" is limited to private business is
primarily based upon the claim that Congress only intended to include
such entities within the scope of RICO. The proponents of this contention rely on an ejusdem generis2 approach to reading section 1961(4)
59. Id. at 439.
60. Id. at 439 n.ll.
61. Id. at 439 (quoting Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No.
91-452, 84 Stat. 922).
62. Where general words follow specific words in an enumeration describing
the legal subject, the general words are construed to embrace only objects similar
in nature to those objects enumerated by the preceding specific words. Where the
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as well as legislative history to support their claim. The opposing view
rejects the ejusdem generis approach as inapplicable and relies on the
liberal construction mandate of section 904(a) and legislative history to
conclude that Congress did not intend to limit "enterprise" to private
organizations.
1.

Public "Business" Entities.

The public versus private issue was addressed by the Third Circuit
in United States v. Frumento63 where the Pennsylvania Bureau of
Cigarette and Beverage Taxes (PBCBT) was held to be an "enterprise." The appellants had been indicted for smuggling cigarettes into
Pennsylvania for the purpose of resale without payment of the Pennsylvania cigarette tax. Two of the appellants had worked for the
PBCBT, one as a district supervisor and the other as a field inspector.
The district court 6" had determined that the PBCBT, as an arm of
the Department of Revenue charged with a statutory duty to collect
taxes, was a "legal entity" and as such fit within the RICO definition
of "enterprise." The appellants argued, however, that the rule of
ejusdem generisi5 compelled the conclusion that because "legal entity"
66
follows nouns pertaining to different forms of business ventures, it
likewise was intended to include only legal business entities.
In an attempt to support their facial reading of the statute, the appellants noted the lack of any reference to governmental bodies in the
legislative history of the OCCA. They relied on United States v.
Mande 67 where the court concluded that congressional silence as to
public entities such as governments indicated an intent to exclude them
from RICO coverage.
The Frumento court responded to the appellant's contentions by
first dismissing the ejusdem generis argument as inapplicable:
The rule should not be employed when the intention of the legislature is
As we read the Organized Crime Control Act,
otherwise evident ....
opposite sequence is found, i.e. specific words following a general, the doctrine is
equally applicable, restricting application of the general term to things that are
similar to those enumerated.
2A C. SANDS, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 47.17 (4th ed. 1973) (citations omitted).
63. 563 F.2d 1083 (3rd Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1072 (1978).
64. United States v. Frumento, 405 F. Supp. 23 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
65. See note 62 supra.
66. See note 37 supra. Appellants also argued that the civil remedies provided for
in section 1964, specifically orders for dissolution and reorganization and provisions
for treble damages, could not have been intended to be applicable to state agencies.
The court did not address these contentions.
67. 415 F. Supp. 997 (D. Md. 1976), aff'd in part and vacated and remanded in
part, 591 F.2d 1347 (4th Cir.), aff'd on rehearing, 602 F.2d 653 (4th Cir. 1979).
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Congress was not so much concerned with limiting the protective and
remedial features of the act to business and labor organizations as it was
with reducing the insidious capabilities of persons in organized crime to
infiltrate the American economy.6S
The court added that Congress was concerned about the effects of
organized crime on the American economy in general as opposed to
the limited areas within the economy. "Is it conceivable that in considering the ever more widespread tentacles of organized crime in the
nation's economic life, Congress intended to ignore an important
aspect of the economy because it was state operated and state controlled? We think not." 6 9
Despite the court's rejection of a strict "business" requirement
under section 1961(4), it chose to point out that certain aspects of the
Pennsylvania government are operated as a business. "The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania purchases, distributes, and sells alcoholic
beverages legally consumed among its more than 12,000,000 citizens; it
sells and distributes games of chance through its much touted lottery
system." 7 0 The court reasoned that if the appellant's reading of section
1962 was accepted, state owned and operated business organizations
"would be open game for racketeers." 7
Although the Third Circuit in Frumento held that a RICO enterprise need not be a private entity, it apparently recognized a necessity
for connecting the public entity to the American economy. Two weeks
prior to deciding Frumento, the Third Circuit had responded to the
same recognition in a different way. In United States v. Forsythe," the
court held that RICO applied to the activities of magistrates73 and constables. Perhaps to ensure a nexus between the RICO "enterprise" and
the economy, the court determined that the enterprise through which
the officials operated a bribery scheme was not the court system, but
rather was a bail bond agency. Payments had been made to the officials for referring to the agency defendants who had been brought
before the magistrates.
The district court" ' had dismissed the charges against the
magistrates "since the plain interpretation of . . . section [1962(c)]
clearly excludes the magistrates from liability for participation in the
68. 563 F.2d at 1090.
69. Id. at 1091.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. 560 F.2d 1127 (3rd Cir. 1977).
73. Id. at 1131 n.l. The court explained that, as used in the opinion, the term
"magistrates" includes alderman and justices of the peace.
74. United States v. Forsythe, 429 F. Supp. 715 (W.D. Pa. 1977).
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operation of the bail bond agency."'" The court stated that section
1962(c) only prohibits the wrongful conduct of those who are
"employed by or associated with ' 7 6 the enterprise. "The term
'associated with' is plainly ejusdem generis with the term 'employed
by' and refers to parties 'inside' the enterprise rather than those 'outside.' ""
On appeal the Third Circuit reversed the district court, stating that
Congress intended to make RICO violations dependent upon behavior
rather than status.78
Section 1962(c) prohibits any person from engaging in the proscribed
conduct and defines the term 'associated with' as direct or indirect participation in the conduct of the enterprise. At the least, the activities of
the magistrates and constables as described in the indictments constitute
indirect participation in the Agency's affairs. 9
The court proceeded to describe the magistrates' participation in the
agency's affairs as more than indirect, likening it to an employee relationship. "Moreover, it is alleged that these defendants were paid
directly by the Agency in return for referral of clients, just as salesmen
or agents would be paid a commission for like services.","
By relating the magistrates' bribery activities to the bail bond
agency rather than to the court system, the Forsythe court effectively
reached public officials without having to deal with bringing a nonbusiness related public entity under RICO. Other courts, however,
have had to deal more directly with the issue whether RICO's definition of "enterprise" includes a public entity that is not related to any
business activity.
2.

Nonbusiness Public Entities.

Despite the Third Circuit's apparent hesitancy to extend the
"enterprise" concept to nonbusiness public entities, the Seventh Circuit, in United States v. Grzywacz,8 ' saw no business requirement and
held that a city police department and its individual officers are "legal
75. Id. at 725.
76. Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (1976)).
77. Id.
78. The court cited United States v. Mandel, 415 F. Supp. 997, 1018 (D. Md.
1976), which stated that a conviction under RICO is not dependent upon a showing
that the defendant is a member of organized crime.
79. 560 F.2d at 1136.
80. Id.
81. 603 F.2d 682 (7th Cir. 1979).
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entities" and thus are within the section 1961(4) definition of enterprise. II
The appellants in Grzywacz were three former police officers who
had been convicted of conspiracy to violate section 1962(c) of RICO in
violation of section 1962(d). The indictment from which they were
convicted alleged a conspiracy by the officers to use their official positions to solicit and accept bribes and sexual favors from business
establishments in exchange for "protection" and acquiescence in prostitution activities and operation after closing hours.
The appellants contended that the conspiracy charge under section
1962(d) was not proper because the police department was not an
enterprise as defined in section 1961(4). They claimed that RICO was
intended to combat the infiltration of legitimate private businesses by
racketeering activities rather than acts of corruption by public officials. They supported their position by noting that the civil remedies
provided by section 1964 are aimed at violations by private organizations83
The court rejected appellants' contentions by relying on the
holding in United States v. Frumento4 that public entities which have
some relationship with the economy may constitute section 1961(4)
enterprises. Without attempting to show a relationship between the
police department and the economy, the court next cited United States
v. Brown85 which held that the Macon, Georgia police department con82. See also United States v. Vignola, 464 F. Supp. 1091 (E.D. Pa. 1979). The
Vignola court held that "[als a creature of statute ... , the Philadelphia Traffic Court
is a 'legal entity' and is therefore an 'enterprise' for the purpose of RICO." Id. at
1095.
83. See 18 U.S.C. § 1964 (1976). Section 1964 provides:
(a) The district courts of the United States shall have jurisdiction to prevent and
restrain violations of section 1962 of this chapter by issuing appropriate orders, including, but not limited to: ordering any person to divest himself of any interest,
direct or indirect, in any enterprise; imposing reasonable restrictions on the future
activities or investments of any person, including, but not limited to, prohibiting
any person from engaging in the same type of endeavor as the enterprise engaged
in, the activities of which affect interstate or foreign commerce; or ordering
dissolution or reorganization of any enterprise, making due provision for the
rights of innocent persons.
(b) The Attorney General may institute proceedings under this section. In any
action brought by the United States under this section, the court shall proceed as
soon as practicable to the hearing and determination thereof. Pending final determination thereof, the court may at any time enter such restraining orders or prohibitions, or take such other actions, including the acceptance of satisfactory performance bonds, as it shall deem proper.
84. 563 F.2d 1083 (3rd Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1072 (1978).
85. 555 F.2d 407 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 904 (1978). The appellants
were former officers of the Macon, Georgia, police department. They were convicted,
under RICO section 1962(c), of knowingly participating, as employees of the city
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol5/iss2/6
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stituted an enterprise under RICO. The Brown court primarily relied
on the portion of the congressional statement of findings relating to
the subversion and corruption of America's democratic process and
the threat to domestic security.
The Grzywacz court found that the authority and reasoning of
Frumento and Brown, coupled with the congressional statement that
RICO is to be liberally construed, S" formed a sufficient basis for qualifying a police department and individual police officers as enterprises.
3. Private Business Only.
Not all courts have been willing to extend the meaning of "enterprise" beyond private entities. The court in United States v. Mandel 7
held that the State of Maryland is not an enterprise under RICO.
In Mandel, the government argued that as a "legal entity," the
state would fall within the definitional requirements of section 1961(4).
The court, however, was reluctant to construe the words "legal entity"
to the limits of its potential definitional scope, "particularly where
they follow words of a much more precise and narrow application.''88
In looking to the legislative history of RICO, the court noted that Congress was silent as to public entities such as governments and that to include them within the definition "would do violence to the plain purpose of Title IX. The legislative history is full of references to the major purpose of Title IX: to rid racketeering influences from the commercial life of the nation." 89 The court further indicated that the
remedies provided for in section 1964, including treble damages,
divestiture, and forfeiture, imply that Congress contemplated private
entities in defining "enterprise." "It could hardly be contended that a
private citizen of a state, aggrieved by the 'racketeering acts' of an official in conducting the state, could bring a treble damage action
against that official and require forfeiture of office and dissolution of
the state government."' 0
Another argument accepted by the Mandel court was the assertion
that state governments do not require and should not receive federal
police department, in solicitation and acceptance of bribes to protect gambling, prostitution, and the illicit manufacture, distribution, and sale of whiskey. The former officers were also convicted of conspiring to violate section 1962(c), in violation of section 1962(d).
86. See note 15 supra.
87. 415 F. Supp. 997 (D. Md. 1976), aff'd in part and vacated and remanded in
part, 591 F.2d 1347 (4th Cir.), aff'd on rehearing, 602 F.2d 653 (4th Cir. 1979).
88. Id. at 1020.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 1021.
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"assistance" in controlling corruption of public officials. Because
states have laws regulating the conduct of their officials that are adequate to protect themselves from those officials' racketeering acts,
"[ilt is simply untenable to argue that Congress, without saying so, intended to federalize crimes involving the acts of a public official in
conducting the government of a state." 9 ' The court added that without
a clear indication of congressional intent, courts should be reluctant to
broadly construe a criminal statute so as to transform matters of local
concern into federal felonies.
The final reason given for the Mandel court's conclusion centered
on application of the doctrine of ejusdem generis, the basis of an argument rejected by the court in United States v. Frumento." The Mandel
court noted that the list of entities in section 1961(4) is comprised of
common legal forms used by business and labor groups to carry out
their private functions and that no public entities are included. "The
more general references to 'any legal entity' and 'any group of persons
associated in fact although not a legal entity' must be construed to be
limited to the same type and class entities which preceded it in
statutory definition." 93 Accordingly, the court concluded that "enterprise" is limited to private entities and therefore excludes the State of
Maryland.
C. Legitimate Business vs. Illegitimate Business
While some courts were addressing the issue whether the racketeerinfiltrated enterprise could be public as well as private, a far greater
number of courts were facing the issue of whether the racketeering activities must be connected with any legitimate organization, public or
private. A clear majority of these courts have held that there need be
no such connection with a legitimate organization and that the enterprise can be the racketeering "organization" through which the
racketeering is conducted."' The majority position has the net effect of
erasing any practical distinction between "enterprise" and "racketeering activities" because a racketeering "organization" would appear to
be prohibited only because of its racketeering activities. 95
Five of the six circuits to address the question have interpreted
91. Id.

92. See note 68 and accompanying text supra.
93. 415 F.Supp. at 1021.
94. See, e.g., United States v.McLaurin, 557 F.2d 1064 (5th Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 1020 (1978) (prostitution); United States v.Morris, 532 F.2d 436 (5th
Cir. 1976) (interstate gambling); United States v. Castellano, 416 F. Supp. 125
(E.D.N.Y. 1975) (loan sharking).
95. See note 155 and accompanying text infra.
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RICO in this way9 6 and the remaining circuit may soon join the
others." ' One district court has also ruled contrary to the five circuits.98
The two courts comprising the minority position have held that
RICO only prohibits the infiltration of legitimate business by persons
engaged in racketeering activity. This view, therefore, requires more
than a racketeering "organization." The racketeering activity, and implicitly the racketeering "organization," must be sufficiently linked to
a legitimate concern before a RICO violation can be committed.
In order to understand how the majority and minority positions arrive at their respective conclusions, a review of the arguments of each
is necessary.
1.

The Majority Rationale.

The rationale underlying the majority position can be broken down
into four distinct arguments: (1) a "plain meaning" reading of sections
1961 and 1962 compels the conclusion that illegitimate enterprises are
not excluded from RICO prohibitions, (2) legislative history presents
no evidence that Congress intended that "enterprise" be limited to
legitimate business, (3) section 904(a) mandates a broad construction
of the RICO -provisions, and (4) the weight of authority supports the
inclusion of illegitimate enterprises within the meaning of "enterprise."
Because the majority position is represented by numerous cases9 9
and each relies upon at least one of the aforementioned arguments, the
discussion of the majority rationale will focus upon the arguments
rather than the individual cases.' 0
96. See note 17 supra.
97. See note 20 and accompanying text supra.
98. See United States v. Moeller, 402 F. Supp. 49 (D. Conn. 1975). Because the
Second Circuit in United States v. Altese, 542 F.2d 104 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 1039 (1977), has held that a RICO "enterprise" is not limited to legitimate
business, Moeller is no longer good law in the Second Circuit. For the purpose of this
comment, Moeller will be relied upon only for its discussion of the minority position
rationale.
99. To date, approximately fourteen cases comprise the majority position. Added
to those court of appeals decisions listed in note 17 supra are United States v.
Fineman, 434 F. Supp. 189 (E.D. Pa. 1977); United States v. Winstead, 421 F. Supp.
295 (N.D. Ill. 1976); United States v. Castellano, 416 F. Supp. 125 (E.D.N.Y. 1975).
Another relevant case is United States v. Hansen, 422 F. Supp. 430 (E.D. Wis.), aff'd,
583 F.2d 325 (7th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 912 (1978). The Hansen court did
not address the issue of whether an illegitmate "organization" could be a RICO
"enterprise," but it upheld an indictment charging "a conspiracy and a racketeering
organization to torch inner city properties and to collect insurance proceeds by use of
the mails." Id. at 434.
100. Because the cases comprising the majority position tend to rely on the
arguments made by the other majority courts, the issues are not extensively discussed
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The primary argument presented by the majority position is that
the RICO language is clear and unambiguous. The conclusion, at least
implicitly, is that the plain meaning "rule" of statutory construction
should be followed. ' 0' The essence of the rule is that the courts should
only interpret legislation when there is some ambiguity in the language
or conflict between the provisions. When the language plainly and
clearly expresses the intent of the legislature, that language should be
applied as read.' 0 2
The majority of courts assert that the definition of "enterprise" in
section 1961(4) and as used in section 1962, clearly expresses congressional intent. In United States v. Altese'0 3 the court stated:
We first note that each of the four paragraphs of section 1962 begins
with the all inclusive phrase: 'It shall be unlawful for any person . ..'
who has received any income derived from any pattern of racketeering
activity, etc., to use any part of such income in the acquisition of 'any
enterprise engaged in

. .

. interstate or foreign commerce.' (emphasis sup-

plied). The word 'any' is explicit. In addition, we note that in Section
1961 the Congress in defining the words 'person' and 'enterprise' again
uses the word 'any.' In light of the continued repetition of the word 'any'
we cannot say that 'a reading of the statute' evinces a Congressional intent to eliminate illegitimate businesses from the orbit of the Act. On the
contrary we find ourselves obliged to say that Title IX in its entirety says
in clear, precise unambiguous language - the use of the word 'any' - that
all enterprises that are conducted through a pattern of racketeering activity of collection of unlawful debts fall within the interdiction of the
Act. "'

The court in United States v. Cappetto"' was more succinct in
stating the majority view: "There is nothing in the language of subsection (b) or (c) [§ 1962] or in the definition section of the Act, Section
in each decision. Therefore, only the more representative cases will be referred to in
this section of the comment.
101. See United States v. Rone, 598 F.2d 564 (9th Cir. 1979); United States v.
Altese, 542 F.2d 104 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1039 (1977); United States
v. Cappetto, 502 F.2d 1351 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 925 (1975).
102. See generally 2A C. SANDS, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION §
46.01 (4th ed. 1973).

103. 542 F.2d 104 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1039 (1977). The court
reversed an order of the district court which had dismissed two counts of an indictment
charging the defendants with conducting a gambling business through a pattern of
racketeering activity and with the collection of unlawful debts in violation of RICO
section 1962(c).
104. Id. at 106.
105. 502 F.2d 1351 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 925 (1975). The court
held that an illegal gambling business falls within the defintions of "racketeering activity" and "enterprise" as contemplated by the prohibitions of RICO section 1962(b).
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1961, to suggest that the enterprise must be a legitimate one."'", The
conclusion of these courts, therefore, is that no further investigation
into congressional intent is required. "When no ambiguity is apparent
on the face of a statute, an examination of the legislative history is inappropriate."'"7
Although the issue seemingly is resolved by reading and applying
the "plain meaning" of the statute, the courts have looked to
legislative history despite its apparent irrelevancy. They agree that even
upon such an inspection, nothing can be found to alter their reading of
RICO.' 0 8
The court in United States v. Rone"' admitted that "a significant
purpose of the legislation 'was to address the problems of infiltration
of legitimate business by persons connected with organized crime.' I
It was not willing to admit, however, that recognition of that particular purpose by Congress necessitated a finding that there must be
actual infiltration. The court looked to the "prophylactic aims" of
RICO - "arresting the infiltration of regular commerce by organized
crime,""' - to determine that "[b]y prohibiting the functioning of illegitimate enterprises, participants in them are denied the sources of income used to invest in legitimate businesses.'"" 2 Thus, the court concluded, by prohibiting illicit enterprises from functioning, the goals of
RICO would ultimately, albeit indirectly, be served.
Some of the decisions rely on the general goals behind the OCCA
to justify a broad interpretation of RICO. In Altese the court quoted
the congressional statement of purpose of the OCCA' ' and concluded
that "[t]hese new penal prohibitions, enhanced sanctions, and new
remedies clearly extend to an illegitimate business as well as a
legitimate one.")
The court in Cappetto supported its position that illegal enterprises
are included within section 1961(4) by quoting a statement, found in
106. Id. at 1358.
107. United States v. Rone, 598 F.2d 564, 569 (9th Cir. 1979).
108. Id. See also United States v. Altese, 542 F.2d 104 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 1039 (1977); United States v. Castellano, 416 F. Supp. 125 (E.D.N.Y. 1975).
109. 598 F.2d 564 (9th Cir. 1979). The court affirmed the conviction under RICO
section 1962 of two persons who had engaged in a pattern of racketeering activity that
included murder and extortion. The court held that the "enterprise" concept under
RICO encompasses illicit enterprises, including an enterprise to commit extortion.
110. Id. at 569.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. See note 1 supra.
114. 542 F.2d at 106.
Published by eCommons, 1980

UNIVERSITY OF DAYTON LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 5:2

the OCCA legislative history, made in reference to section 1955.1 ' The
court implicitly reasoned that because the Senate report referred to a
need to prohibit "substantial business enterprises of gambling" under
section 1955, Congress must also have intended to include organized
gambling activities within the section 1961(4) definition of "enterprise. "
In sum, the general argument that legislative history indicates a
RICO prohibition of even wholly illegitimate entities is based upon two
findings: (1) a lack of direct evidence that Congress specifically did not
intend such a prohibition, and (2) such an interpretation is compatible
with the overall thrust of the OCCA.
The third rationale behind the majority position is based upon section 904(a) of title IX which indicates that Congress intended RICO to
be construed liberally. I 6 As stated in United States v. Altese, Congress
"inserted a clause providing that the provisions of Title IX 'be liberally
construed to effectuate its remedial purposes.' We cannot - in light of
such language - hold that Congress did not say what it meant nor
7
meant [sic] what it said." 1
Finally, as a fourth rationale, the, courts often rely on each other in
support of their broad construction of RICO. In holding that the
"enterprise" concept of RICO includes unlawful as well as lawful
business, the District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania' 8
stated that the argument that section 1961(4) is limited to legitimate
enterprises "is foreclosed by such cases as U.S. v. Cappetto . . . and
U.S. v. Parness . . . which hold that unlawful as well as lawful
businesses are included within the 'enterprise' concept embodied in
RICO.,"1 9
115. Section 1955 is the codified version of title VIII of the OCCA. It prohibits the
operation of illegal gambling businesses. The Cappetto court stated:
Congress' intention to include an illegal gambling business in the categories of
'racketeering activity' and 'enterprise' appears not only from the language of the
statute but from the Senate Committee Report:
'Despite the best efforts made to date by both the Federal and the several
State governments, gambling continues to exist on a large scale to the benefit
of organized crime and the detriment of the American people. A more effective effort must be mounted to eliminate illegal gambling. In that effort the
Federal Government must be able not only to deny the use and facilities of interstate commerce to the day-to-day operations of illegal gamblers - as it can
do under existing statutes - but also to prohibit directly substantial business
enterprises to gambling . . . .' Sen. Rep. 91-617, pp. 72, 73 (1969).
502 F.2d at 1358.
116. See note 15 supra.
117. 542 F.2d at 106.
118. United States v. Fineman, 434 F. Supp. 189 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
119. Id. at 193. Although the court in Parnessstated that section 1962 is to be construed broadly, it did not address the issue of whether a RICO "enterprise" must be a
legitimate organization. See note 25 supra.
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2. The Minority Rationale.
The minority view, represented only by United States v. Moeller' °
and United States v. Sutton,'' have countered the majority position
by arguing: (1) the "plain meaning" given sections 1961 and 1962 by
the majority courts does not acknowledge "enterprise" as an element
of the prohibitions, (2) legislative history clearly shows that Congress
only intended for RICO to reach infiltration of legitimate business,
and (3) regardless of a congressional mandate for liberal construction,
the statute must be read within certain limitations. The Moeller court
held that an "enterprise" under section 1962 must be a legitimate activity and therefore could not be a group of individuals associated for
the purpose of burning and destroying buildings.' " The court in Sutton similarily stated that RICO "enterprise" is an entity acting for
some ostensibly lawful purpose, either formally or informally recognized. The court also explained that "[slection 1962 is violated
whenever any person associated with such an enterprise conducts its
'affairs,' i.e., undertakes any activity on behalf of or relating to the
purposes of the enterprise, by committing at least two criminal acts
constituting
a 'pattern of racketeering' as defined in section
''

1961(5).

112

In Moeller the court supported its holding by first looking to the
legislative history of RICO.'' It noted that in the section-by-section
analysis of RICO by Senate Report 91-617, section 1962 was quoted as
establishing "a threefold prohibition aimed at the infiltration of
25
legitimate organizations."'
The second reason given by the Moeller court for its holding
centered on the civil remedies provided for in section 1964. '26 The
120. 402 F. Supp. 49 (D. Conn. 1975). See note 98 supra.
121. 605 F.2d 260 (6th Cir. 1979). The Sutton decision has been vacated and
therefore only its rationale is referred to as representative of the minority view. See
notes 18 and 20 and accompanying text supra.
122. A portion of count eight of the indictment against the appellant alleged that
the appellants constituted an enterprise engaged in interstate commerce, "to wit: a
group of individuals associated in fact for the purpose of burning and destroying
buildings [and] did unlawfully, wilfully and knowingly conduct and participate in the
affairs of such enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity . . . .to wit: arson . . . . and kidnaping [sic]." 402 F. Supp. at 57.
123. 605 F.2d at 270.
124. The court noted that the "(tihe statutory definition of 'enterprise' contains no
words of limitation concerning the lawfulness of activities. § 1961(4). The legislative
history, however, provides the clearest indication that Congress intended 'enterprise'
to mean legitimate business." 402 F. Supp. at 58. The Court gave no indication as to
why a facial reading should not govern the construction of the language.
125. Id.

126.

See note 83 supra.
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Senate report states that these remedial provisions were aimed at the
"reform of corrupted organizations."' 2 7 According to the Moeller
court, "[tihat comment can have reference only to a legitimate
business corrupted by racketeering money or activity."'",
Finally, the court gave two reasons why any doubt about the scope
of RICO should be resolved in favor of a narrow construction. "First
is the traditional canon of resolving ambiguities in criminal statutes in
favor of lenity."' 29 The court's second concern was "grounded in principles of federalism, not to give federal criminal laws a broad construction that 'would alter sensitive federal-state relationships' or 'transform relatively minor state offenses into federal felonies.' ""30
In Sutton the court supported its holding with the same general
arguments as were discussed in Moeller. The Sutton court, however,
addressed an issue which was avoided by the Moeller court. "Our
analysis begins with the language of the statute."' 3'
The court stated that the government's literal reading' 32 of the section 1961(4) definition of "enterprise" was deceptive. "What parades
under the guise of rigorous fidelity to the text turns out, upon examination, to read the 'enterprise' element entirely out of the statute."' 33
According to the court, if "the enterprise [is] 'for the purpose of
defrauding insurance companies by the use of the mails and committing acts of arson,' and the racketeering activity [consists] of
defrauding insurance companies through the mails and arson," the
"enterprise" element of the crime becomes redundant.' 3 ' Under such a
construction, "every 'pattern of racketeering activity' becomes an
'enterprise' whose affairs are conducted through the 'pattern of
racketeering activity.' Plainly, that is not the statute Congress has writ-

ten."'''3

127. S. REP. No. 91-617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 160 (1969).
128. 402 F. Supp. at 59.
129. Id. (citing Rewis v. United States, 401 U.S. 808 (1971) and Bell v. United
States, 349 U.S. 81 (1955) for the proposition).
130. 402 F. Supp. at 59. See notes 178-182 and accompanying text infra.
131. 605 F.2d at 264.
132. The government contended that because section 1961(4) defines "enterprise"
as "any individual, partnership, corporation, association, or other legal entity" and
because the appellants were "a group of individuals associated in fact," thereby forming a "single enterprise - operated for the purpose of making money from repeated
criminal activity," the appellants' activities were encompassed by RICO. Id. (quoting
from the Brief for the United States at 23, United States v. Sutton, 605 F.2d 260 (6th
Cir. 1979)).
133. 605 F.2d at 265.
134. Id. The court used the facts in United States v. Hansen, 422 F. Supp. 430
(E.D. Wis.), affrd, 583 F.2d 325 (7th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 912 (1978) in its
example.
135. 605 F.2d at 266.
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Although the Sutton decision was vacated and set for rehearing en
banc,'3 6 it provides the most thorough and comprehensive treatment of
any decision addressing sections 1961 and 1962 of RICO. The Moeller
decision also contains an extensive discussion of the legitimate versus
illegitimate issue. Both decisions, therefore, are useful in evaluating the
majority position and will be referred to in the following discussion.
IV. ANALYSIS
More than a concern for linguistic consistency is involved in the
differing judicial interpretations of RICO. The two separate readings,
in effect, create two different statutes. A far greater number of potential violaters can be reached under a "liberal" reading because those
who "merely" engage in racketeering activities can be prosecuted
under the statute. Under a "strict" reading, a separate offense, infiltration of a legitimate business by the racketeer, must be committed.
Presumably only those racketeering operations which are extensive
enough to attempt "take-overs" of legitimate businesses will be within
the reach of RICO under a "strict" reading. The small-time operator
will need to be dealt with by other laws.' 37
The following analysis will attempt to illustrate the flaws in the rationale supporting the "liberal" majority position. Although this
"liberal" view is represented by a far greater number of courts, the
position taken by the minority courts appears to be based upon
stronger reasoning and a more thorough analysis of the issue.
Each aspect of the rationale supporting the majority position contains flaws which detract from its persuasiveness. Upon close inspection one finds that the meaning of the statutory language is really not
so plain, the legislative history does not appear to support the construction given RICO by the courts, and the section of title IX calling
for a liberal construction is limited in its impact. These and other
reasons combine to compel the conclusion that RICO has been applied
in ways not contemplated by Congress.
A.

Plain Meaning

The majority position relies heavily on the plain meaning "rule" to
support a broad application of RICO. This canon of statutory construction has been criticized as unwarranted, if not impossible to implement. 'I3
136. See note 20 and accompanying text supra.
137. RICO only prohibits a "pattern" of offenses chargeable under other state and
federal laws. See note 37-40 and accompanying text supra.
138. See Merz, The Meaninglessness of the Plain Meaning Rule, 4 U. DAY. L. REV.
31 (1979). Judge Merz argues that the nature of human language requires constant inPublished by eCommons, 1980
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One critic has offered an alternative approach: If it can be agreed
that legislation is always a purposive act, then the value of an approach which emphasizes first the general purpose of the statute
should be clear. If we ask ourselves first of all what it was the
legislature was trying to accomplish by the statute, we shall have the
most important clue to understanding what they meant when they
enacted certain language.
Once the court has attributed a general purpose to the legislature, it
should proceed to interpret the words of the statute immediately in
question so as to carry out the purpose as best it can, making sure,
however, that it does not give the words either a meaning they will not
bear or a meaning which would violate any established policy of clear

statement.' 19

This view deems the plain meaning approach to be an inappropriate means of reading statutory language. Even assuming the approach to be valid, however, there appear to be limitations to its application. An often cited authority on statutory construction states that
"[t]he literal interpretation of the words of an act should not prevail if
it creates a result contrary to the apparent intention of the legislature
and if the words are sufficiently flexible to admit of a construction
terpretation. People develop linguistically by attaching meaning to words based upon
referents to which they have been exposed. Because no two people have been exposed
to the same referents for each word they have learned, no two meanings for any given
word are exactly alike. When a person hears a word he or she must attempt to match
referents with the speaker in order to share a common meaning. This process is
facilitated by "context." If the listener understands that the speaker's set of referents,
or context, is the front room of a house, he or she may interpret the word "chair" in a
different way than if the listener believes the speaker's context to be that of an
auditorium. Words can create the context from which we understand other words. Applied to statutory construction, this approach calls for first understanding the
legislature's context or purpose before giving meaning to its words.
The court in Sutton expressed this perspective on statutory construction in discussing the language of the section 1961(4) definition of "enterprise":
Section 1961(4) catalogues the kinds of organizational units that may, for statutory purposes, qualify as an 'enterprise' - anything from legal entities such as corporations or partnerships, to entities without formally recognized legal personalities such as 'any union or group of individuals associated in fact,' even to
'any individual.' However, the statutory definition is silent regarding what attributes or activities these units assume or undertake before they may be deemed
an 'enterprise' in any meaningful sense. Obviously, every 'individual' or 'group of
individuals,' considered in the abstract, is not an 'enterprise.' Individuals and
groups do not become 'enterprises' except in relation to something they do. The
statutory definition of 'enterprise' contained in section 1961(4) is incomplete
because it does not tell us what that 'something' is.
605 F.2d at 265.
139. Merz, supra note 138, at 39-40.
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which will effectuate the legislative intention." 0 Based upon this standard, the "liberal" interpretation of section 1962 should not prevail.
As will be discussed later in this comment, 1"' the literal construction
given section 1962 by the majority position does not appear to effectuate the intent of Congress.
Assuming, arguendo, that the plain meaning approach is appropriate in construing RICO, its application to section 1962 seems to
compel a conclusion contrary to the majority position.
The stance taken by the majority fails because the courts assume
that anything that fits the definition of "enterprise" in section 1961
will automatically fit into section 1962.142 This will usually work in instances where the enterprise is distinct from the racketeering activity.
Such is the case in Parness, Frumento, and Grzywacz where facially
the statute makes sense regardless of whether the enterprise is interpreted to be public or private." 3
Although it is easy to read the plain meaning of a section 1961
enterprise to include the same illegal activities as comprise the
racketeering activity," 4 the meaning of the statute becomes less obvious when such a definition of enterprise is read into section 1962.
This can be illustrated by inserting into section 1962 "gambling activity" in place of "racketeering activity" and "organized gambling" in
place of "enterprise." Subsection (a) would then read: "It shall be
140. 2A C. SANDS, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 46.07 (4th ed.
1973).
141. See discussion in section IV B infra.
142. See notes 103-106 and accompanying text supra. Although the courts note
that sections 1961(4) and 1962 individually contain no words of limitation, they do not
address the way the sections interact.
143. Using the facts in Parness, for example, the insertion of "theft and
deception" into section 1962(a) for "racketeering activity" and "foreign corporation"
for "enterprise" creates the following reading of section 1962(a): "It shall be unlawful
for any person who has received any income . . . from a pattern of theft and deception.., to use or invest.., any part of such income... in acquisition of any interest
in, or the establishment or operation of, a foreign corporation which is engaged in...
interstate or foreign commerce." Cf. note 16 supra (text of section 1962 (a)). See also
Judge Swygert's dissenting opinion, United States v. Aleman, 609 F.2d 298, 311 (7th
Cir. 1979) (Swygert, J., dissenting), petitionfor cert.filed, 48 U.S.L.W. 3539 (Feb. 19,
1980) (No. 79-1009). Judge Swygert, who also dissented in Grzywacz, stated: "To
urge, as the Government did in Grzywacz, that a police department is an 'enterprise'
within the meaning of the statute, although farfetched and impermissible by any
reasonable interpretation of the statute, has some semblance of logic to it." Id.
144. This statement assumes that the ejusdem generis "rule" of statutory construction is not applied to the language. See note 62 supra. In United States v. Mandel, 415
F. Supp. 997 (D. Md. 1976), the district court applied this doctrine to section 1961(4)
and concluded that "enterprise" is limited to private entities. See notes 92-93 and accompanying text supra.
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unlawful for any person who has received any income ...from a pattern of gambling activity ... to use or invest ... any part of such income . . . in acquisition of any interest in, or the establishment or
operation of, organized gambling [through which the gambling activity
is conducted] which is engaged in interstate or foreign commerce.' '14
The major problem of reading the subsection this way is one of redundancy. In one way it is "internally" redundant in that it would seem to
prohibit organized gambling from infiltrating itself. If the pattern of
gambling activity is what creates the organized gambling, then a proscription against one is a proscription against the other. Furthermore,
reading the subsection in this manner is redundant in another way. If
the net effect of the subsection is the prohibition of gambling businesses, and consequently their activities, there appears to be little difference between section 1962 and section 1955 which also prohibits
6
gambling businesses. '
Subsections (b) and (c) of section 1962 fare no better. Subsection
(b) would read: "It shall be unlawful for any person through a pattern
of gambling activity ... to acquire or maintain ... any interest in or
control of organized gambling which is engaged in . . .interstate or
foreign commerce.' '1 7 Subsection (c) would read: "It shall be
unlawful for any person employed by or associated with organized
gambling . . . to conduct or participate . . . in the conduct of the
organized gambling's affairs through a pattern of gambling activity . ...-"8Although it is possible to construe section 1962 this way,
such a reading raises doubts that Congress clearly intended this result.
In looking at the statute in the way illustrated above, it appears
that, at the very least, two distinct activities are required to keep the
"enterprise" element separate from the "racketeering activity" element, even if the enterprise is an illegal one. In United States v.
9 the
Elliott,"1
court upheld the RICO conviction of a group of individuals who were found to have formed an organization to engage in
diversified criminal activities.' The court analogized the group to "a
145. Cf. note 16 supra (text of section 1962(a)). For comparison with a section
1962(a) reading with a distinct, legitimate organization inserted for "enterprise," see
note 143 supra.
146. This statement applies only to a criminal prosecution under section 1962. Civil
remedies are provided for under RICO section 1964, but are not available under section 1955. See note 23 supra.
147. Cf. note 16 supra (text of section 1962(b)).
148. Id. (text of section 1962(c)).
149. 57.1 F.2d 880 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 953 (1978).
150. The illegal acts in Elliott included arson, counterfeiting titles, auto theft, and
narcotics trafficking. See also United States v. Malatesta, 583 F.2d 748 (5th Cir. 1978);
United States v. Hawes, 529 F.2d 472 (5th Cir. 1976). In Malatesta, the indictment
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large business conglomerate," 15 1 with officers, departments, and committees. "The thread tying all of these departments' activities and individuals together was the desire to make money.""' The existence of
trucks, airplanes, and a warehouse combined with a semi-formal
organizational hierarchy led the court to the conclusion that an enterprise had been established. Interrelated with, but independent of, the
enterprise as an organization were the acts of arson, car theft, fencing
stolen goods, murder, and narcotics dealing which comprised the pattern of racketeering activity.
The Elliott decision is arguably not in accord with the legislative
history of RICO, ' 3 but at least it makes an effort to comply with what
5
the Sutton court termed a "common sense" facial reading.' Section
1962 includes two separate terms, "enterprise" and "racketeering activity," each with a different definition. The logical conclusion to be
alleged a conspiracy to conduct the day-to-day operation of an enterprise (an illegal
scheme to obtain money, marijauna, and cocaine) through a pattern of racketeering
activities including extortion, kidnapping, and robbery. The convictions from the indictment were affirmed, but the court did not address the issue of whether the illegal
scheme constituted an enterprise under RICO. In Hawes, the "enterprise" was a
gambling business through which three individuals conducted the distribution of illegal
gambling devices. Although the court held that the illegal business was within the
scope of RICO section 1962, the overall business consisted of formal, jointly owned
companies (distributing and leasing companies and night clubs) separate from the individuals themselves.
It is notable that the aforementioned cases, all of which appear to recognize a concern for keeping the concept of "enterprise" distinct from that of "racketeering activity," are from the Fifth Circuit.
151. 571 F.2d at 898. This aspect of the Elliott rationale was referred to in United
States v. Aleman, 609 F.2d 298 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 100 S.Ct. 1345 (1980),
which upheld the conviction of:
'a group of individuals associated in fact to plan and commit robberies, to carry
away stolen goods and to divide among themselves the stolen goods and all proceeds derived therefrom, [who] unlawfully, wilfully, and knowingly did conduct
and participate, directly and indirectly in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs
through a pattern of racketeering activity, to wit, the commission of robberies.'
Id. at 302. In analogizing the robbery "enterprise" with the "business conglomerate"
concept of Elliott, the Aleman court stated:
Perhaps such an impressive organization was the ambition of the defendants in
the present case. At the time it was closed down, however, at least so far as the
evidence reveals, it could only be regarded as a small business. Aleman was the
proprietor. The business office was the Survivor's Club. Their investment in
equipment was negligible as the cars they used were stolen. The payroll was
limited. Perhaps given more time, their business would have successfully grown
into a conglomerate at the expense of their victims, but fortunately for the public
the defendants were put out of business.
Id. at 305.
152. 571 F.2d at 898.
153. See notes 163-173 and accompanying text infra.
154. 605 F.2d at 266.
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drawn from this fact is that Congress intended to prohibit the interrelationship of two separate activities in section 1962.
The court in Sutton recognized this flaw in ,the government's
reading of the statute. "lilt would have us treat section 1962(c) as a
purposeless circumlocution, written in terms of 'enterprises,' and persons 'employed' by them to conduct their 'affairs,' but in reality
directed at anyone who commits two acts of racketeering." I" The Sutton court went further, however, and attacked the concept of
"criminal enterprise" described in Elliott as an "amoeba-like infrastructure that controls a secret criminal network."" ' 6 The court stated
that if such an entity is proscribed by RICO, greater precision of
statutory language is required to avoid violating due process and notice
considerations:
Although government prosecutors may be trained nowadays to recognize
an 'amoeba-like infra-structure' when they see one, our instincts are not
so keenly developed, and we think even racketeers are entitled to know
before the fact at what point their criminal activities will be deemed sufficiently 'amoeba-like' to transgress the statute.'
The Sutton court decided that clearer standards than those provided by the statutory language are necessary to discern the scope of
RICO's applicability. The court investigated RICO's legislative history
to find these clearer standards. It would seem that the majority position's construction of section 1962 creates enough doubt about congressional intent to warrent such an investigation.
B.

CongressionalIntent

The courts have looked to two statutory aids to support the position that section 1962 applies to illegitimate enterprises. The first is the
statement of findings and purpose which precedes the text of the
OCCA.' 8 The second is the legislative history of RICO.
In relying on the statement of findings and purpose to support
their position, the courts have confused the overall goals and purpose
of the OCCA with those of RICO. RICO is but one title out of the
155. Id. See Judge Swygert's dissent in Aleman in which he stated: "Under the
facts and the majority's reasoning based upon those facts, the enterprise and the
racketeering are one and the same. The racketeering defines the enterprise and the
enterprise comprises the racketeering." 609 F.2d at 311 (Swygert, J., dissenting). See
also notes 192-93 and accompanying text infra.
156. 571 F.2d at 898.
157. 605 F.2d at 266. Although the courts have rejected vagueness challenges to
RICO's language, see note 14 supra, the statements made by the Sutton court may indicate that the constitutional issues are not yet completely resolved.
158. See note 1 supra.
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twelve that comprise the entire Act. The court in United States v.
Altese' " quoted the statement of purpose of the OCCA160 and concluded that "these new penal prohibitions, enhanced sanctions, and
new remedies clearly extend to an illegitimate business as well as a
legitimate one; to read the Act otherwise does not make sense since it
leaves a loophole for illegitimate business to escape its coverage."' 6'
Although the Altese court may be accurate in stating that the new
penal prohibitions, sanctions, and remedies extend to illegitimate
business, the assertion does not explain what illegitimate business is
covered, or how it is covered, by RICO. It can probably be assumed
that all of the titles which comprise OCCA have some role in effectuating its general purpose. The problem becomes one of investigating
the legislative history further to determine how Congress intended the
RICO provisions to specifically contribute to the overall goal. With the
exception of Moeller and Sutton, the courts have been reluctant to address this problem.
Determining the role Congress had in mind for RICO is not difficult. In reviewing the hundreds of pages of OCCA legislative history,
numerous discussions of RICO can be found. 162 Proponents and op159. 542 F.2d 104 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1039 (1977).
160. See notes 28-29 and accompanying text supra.
161. 542 F.2d at 106-07. This statement begs the question. The court appears to be
saying that the RICO provisions clearly extend to wholly illegitimate business because,
otherwise, wholly illegitimate business will escape RICO. The problem is caused by the
court's wholesale substitution of the question of OCCA's reach for the particular question of RICO's reach. The salient question, however, is not really whether OCCA applies to illegitimate business, but rather, whether it should reach illegitimate business
by way of RICO in the manner in which it is now applied by the courts.
162. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 91-1549, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in (1970]
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.NEWS 4007. The House Report referred to section 1962 of ti-

tle IX as establishing "a threefold prohibition aimed at stopping the infiltration of
racketeers into legitimate organizations." Id. at 57, U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at
4033.
In discussing the section 1962(a) prohibition against investing funds from a pattern
of racketeering activity, the report stated that "[a]n exception has been provided for
the purchase on the open market of less than 1 percent of a company's securities where
there is no degree of control in law or in fact to the investor." Id. (emphasis supplied).
Referring to subsection (b), the report stated:
There is no 1 percent limitation here as in subsection (a) because (a) focuses on
legitimate acquisition with illegitimate funds. Subsection (b) focuses on illegitimate acquisition with illegitimate funds. Subsection (b) focuses on illegitimate acquisition through the proscribed pattern of activity or collection of
debt. Consequently, any acquisition meeting the test of subsection (b) is prohibited without exception.
Subsection (c) prohibits the conduct of the enterprise through the prohibited
pattern of activity or collection of debt. Again, the prohibition is without exception.
Id. (emphasis supplied).
The report explicitly referred to the infiltration of legitimate business and noted the
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ponents were unanimous in their perception of RICO's purpose. All
referred to title IX as providing prohibitions and sanctions for infiltration of legitimate businesses. No other purpose was mentioned.' 6 3
In United States v. Rone,"' the court admitted that "a significant
purpose of the legislation 'was to address the problems of infiltration
of legitimate business by persons connected with organized crime.' "16,
In United States v. Castellano,'" the court stated, after noting the
basic purpose of the OCCA, that "[w]hile the legislative history
demonstrates that one of the targets of Congress in enacting this law
was the infiltration of legitimate business by racketeers, it was, as indicated above, not its only concern."' 67 These statements represent
two errors in the reasoning behind the majority position: (1) a confusion about the general purpose of RICO and (2) reference to the infiltration of legitimate business as only one of the targets when RICO
legislative history reveals no reference to any other target.'

68

The court in United States v. Moeller'69 extensively discussed the
legislative history of RICO. It found that Congress clearly intended
distinction between legitimate and illegitimate acquisition. Three questions about the
majority position's interpretation of RICO arise from reading the House Report: (1)
How can an illegitimate enterprise be legitimately acquired with illegitimate funds? (2)
How can an illegitimate enterprise acquire itself, legitimately or illegitimately, with illegitimate funds? (3) Although subsection (c) prohibits conduct and not acquisition, if
the "enterprise" concept of subsection (c) is intended to be any more expansive, or different in any other way than "enterprise" as used in the other subsections, why is there
no indication of that intent?
Judge Swygert, in his dissenting opinion in Aleman, addressed the concern underlying the second question above. He stated:
In order to reach the majority's conclusion that such an enterprise exists, we are
required to assume that the defendants were infiltrating their own unlawful enterprise through a 'pattern of racketeering. activity.' To my way of thinking, this
assumption is absurd. To infiltrate an enterprise, that is 'to conduct or participate . . .in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs [section 1962(c)],' the enter-

prise must preexist before it is infiltrated by racketeering. Under the facts and the
majority's reasoning based on those facts, the enterprise and the racketeering are
one and the same.
609 F.2d at 311 (Swygert, J., dissenting).
163. See notes 171-173 and accompanying text infra.
164. 598 F.2d 564 (9th Cir. 1979).
165. Id. at 569 (quoting S. REP. No. 91-617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 76 (1969)).
166. 416 F. Supp. 125 (E.D.N.Y. 1975).
167. Id. at 127.
168. See notes 171-173 and accompanying text infra. In referring to RICO, Senator
John McClellan, co-author of the OCCA, stated that "title IX of S.30, the Organized

Crime Control Act of 1969 .... is expressly aimed at removing the baneful influence

of organized crime from our legitimate commercial endeavors that are all too often today conducted in an illegitimate manner by the forces of organized crime." 116 CONG.
REc. 8670 (1970) (emphasis supplied).
169. 402 F. Supp. 49 (D. Conn. 1975).
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"enterprise" to mean legitimate businesses. The Senate Report was
quoted as stating that "Title IX 'has as its purpose the elimination of
the infiltration of organized crime and racketeering into legitimate
organizations operating in interstate commerce.' ,,,I0 The court additionally noted that "[t]he Report's discussion of Title IX repeatedly
refers to 'legitimate' organizations as the ones to be protected, lists a
number of illustrations, and at no point remotely suggests that Title IX
is intended to penalize investing in, acquiring, or conducting the affairs
of unlawful enterprises."" In a footnote the court further elaborated
its inspection of legislative history: "Nor is there one word in the
House floor debates over the Organized Crime Control Act that would
indicate that any member of Congress thought Title IX would reach
anything but legitimate business."' 2 Seven congressmen were
specifically noted as having expressed the opinion that title IX was intended to prevent infiltration of legitimate businesses, "and none ever
discussed the statute in terms that might be thought to have contemplated the government's use of § 1962.""17
The importance of limiting the scope of RICO to infiltration of
legitimate businesses lies in maintaining the integrity of the role of
Congress to enact laws and the role of the courts to enforce them as
Congress intended when the laws were enacted.' 7 4 By applying RICO
in a manner outside of that intended by the members of Congress
when they enacted the statute, the courts would appear to be acting as
legislatures. This practice is no less inappropriate when the target of
the law is organized crime. 7
C. Section 904(a) and Liberal Construction
The one explicit statement of congressional intent to which the
courts have been rigorously faithful is section 904(a) of RICO. The
section reads: "The provisions of this title shall be liberally construed
to effectuate its remedial purpose."' 6 As with the other aspects of the
170. Id. at 58 (quoting S. REP. No. 91-617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 76 (1969)).
171. 402 F. Supp. at 59.
172. Id. at 58 n.8.
173. Id. The court noted the remarks of Representatives Celler, St. Germain, McCulloch, Kleppe, Railsback, Anderson, and Poff.
174. The Supreme Court, in United States v. American Trucking Ass'ns, 310 U.S.
534 (1940), stated that "[in the interpretation of statutes, the function of the courts is
easily stated. It is to construe the language so as to give effect to the intent of Congress." Id. at 542.
175. In Sutton the court stated: "It is for Congress, not the courts, to amend the
statute to expand its coverage, if that is what an effective policy against organized
crime requires." 605 F.2d at 269.
176. See note 15 supra.
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statute, the courts may have taken unwarranted advantage of what
they have been given."'

Two considerations act to limit the effect of section 904(a). The
first is grounded in federalism principles. By its current application,

RICO transforms many state offenses into federal felonies once a
"pattern" of two state offenses has been established.

That Congress has the authority to reach criminal activities in this
manner is not questioned.' 7 8 The question becomes whether Congress
clearly intended this result. "[U]nless Congress conveys its purpose
clearly, it will not be deemed to have sufficiently changed the federalstate balance."'' 9 As was discussed previously,' 80 the statutory
language of section 1962 as construed by the majority courts creates
some doubts about what Congress may have intended. These doubts
are resolved after a thorough investigation of RICO's legislative
history. When members of Congress specifically referred to RICO provisions, they consistently spoke in terms of infiltration of legitimate
business. Based upon these factors, one would expect the courts to
construe the RICO provisions liberally as per section 904(a), but only
to the point of effectuating the clear and specific intent of Congress to

prohibit the infiltration of organized crime into legitimate enterprises.

In a strong dissent in United States v. Altese,' 8 ' Judge Van

Graafeiland expressed his concern for unwarranted incursions by the
federal criminal law into areas generally left to the states:
177. The court in Sutton stated that:
[ajlthough Congress has declared that RICO's provisions should be 'liberally construed to effectuate its remedial purpose,' we do not read that directive as
authorizing us to write a new and substantially different law. Appellants' construction fully serves the statute's remedial purpose as revealed by all of the guides
to legislative intent.
605 F.2d at 269.
178. In United States v. Nardello, 393 U.S. 286 (1969), the Supreme Court held
that because the congressional purpose behind the Travel Act, now codified at 18
U.S.C. § 1952 (1976), was to assist local law enforcement officials to battle interstate
organized crime activities which violated state laws, the generic terms used in the
Travel Act referred to general conduct prohibited by the states and not to the specific
labels used by a particular state to classify its prohibitions. Presumably the same rationale would apply to the generic incorporation of state offenses in section 1961(1) of
RICO.
179. United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 349 (1971). The Supreme Court stated
that section 1202(a)(1) of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (18
U.S.C.) does not make clear "whether or not receipt or possession of a firearm by a
convicted felon has to be shown in an individual prosecution to have been connected
with interstate commerce," and therefore, the section was held to require a nexus between the offense and interstate commerce. Id. at 336.
180. See discussion in section IV A supra.
181. 542 F.2d 104, 107 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1039 (1977).
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Without a clear and precise direction from Congress, we have created a
statute making it a federal felony for any group, association or conspiracy to violate any state's murder, kidnapping, gambling, arson, rob-

bery, bribery, extortion or narcotics statutes in any manner which utilizesor affects interstate commerce. The disruptive effect of our holding on
federal-state relationships and on the limited enforcement and judicial
resources of the federal government is every bit as great as that of the expansive interpretation of the Travel Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1952, condemned
by the Supreme Court in Rewis v. United States. .... "I

The second limitation on the scope of section 904(a) comes from
section 904(a) itself. "Provisions of this title shall be liberally construed to effectuate its remedialpurpose." The wording would appear
to indicate that for the purposes of effectuating the remedial goals of
RICO, its provisions are to be liberally construed. The negative implication would be that for the purposes of effectuating the penal goals
of RICO, its provisions are not to be liberally construed.
The law has long recognized the distinction between penal laws and
3 the Supreme
civil, or remedial, laws. In Huntington v. Attrill, I8
Court

noted that penal laws have the purpose of punishment and deterrence
of wrongs against the community. Civil laws, on the other hand, give a
private right of action.18 ' The section headings of the RICO provisions
themselves make this distinction. Section 1963 is titled "Criminal
penalties" and section 1964 is titled "Civil remedies." Congress ap-

parently recognized the difference in the causes of actions provided by
RICO. Section 904(a) mandates a liberal construction only to effectuate RICO's remedial purpose. It is difficult to imagine how a liberal

construction of section 1962 in a section 1963 criminal or "penal" proceeding will effectuate the remedial purpose of RICO." ' It would ap182. Id. at 109-110 (Van Graafeiland, J., dissenting). See also United States v.
Rone, 598 F.2d 564, 573 (9th Cir. 1979) (Ely, J., dissenting).
183. 146 U.S. 657 (1892).
184. Id. at 666-69. Moreover:
[t]he underlying test to be applied in determining whether a statute is penal or
remedial is whether it primarily seeks to impose an arbitrary, deterring punishment upon any who might commit a wrong against the public by a violation of the
requirements of the statute, or whether the purpose is to measure and define the
damages which may accrue to an individual or class of individuals, as just and
reasonable compensation for a possible loss having a catisal connection with the
breach of the legal obligation owing under the statute to such individual or class.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1163 (5th ed. 1979).

185. A case which addressed RICO issues other than the legitimate versus illegitimate enterprise question held that RICO is a remedial statute and therefore
should be read broadly. United States v. Pray, 452 F. Supp. 788, 800 (M.D. Pa. 1978).
The case involved a criminal indictment under section 1962(c). The court did not explain how a statute upon which a criminal prosecution is based can be wholly remedial
in nature.
Published by eCommons, 1980

UNIVERSITY OF DAYTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 5:2

pear, therefore, that the congressional "liberal construction" mandate
applies to other RICO provisions, including section 1962, only when
the complaining party is seeking civil remedies under section 1964.186
For all of the aforementioned reasons, the statement in section
904(a), regarding a liberal construction of RICO provisions, gives little
guidance as to whether or not "enterprise" as defined in section
1961(4) and as used in section 1962, is limited to legitimate business.
D.

Self Reliance
The courts which hold that a RICO "enterprise" is not limited to
legitimate business often cite each other to support their position. A
case which only discussed the applicability of RICO to foreign corporations has also been cited as supporting the inclusion of illegitimate
organizations within the concept of "enterprise."' 87 Because of this
cross-referencing between cases the majority view is now represented
by a deceptively persuasive number of cases with little in the way of extensive and thorough substantive analysis.' 8 The minority position, as
represented by the Moeller decision, is outnumbered by the majority
position, and will continue to be so even should the Sutton decision
again align itself with the district court. Both Moeller and Sutton,
however, have analyzed the "enterprise" issue much more extensively
than have any of the majority courts.
One example of the majority's somewhat cursory treatment of the
issue can be seen in its reading of the statutory language. The majority
states that because the section 1961(4) definition of "enterprise" contains no language to limit the concept to legitimate business, the section 1962 prohibition against infiltrating an "enterprise" must include
illegitimate organizations. 8 9
In Sutton on the other hand, the court did not assume that what
fits into section 1961(4) will necessarily fit into section 1962.190 Instead,
section 1962 was read with the government's definition inserted. The
186. Nearly all of the cases in which RICO has been given the "liberal construction" have been criminal proceedings. In United States v. Cappetto, 502 F.2d 1351
(7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 925 (1975), the government chose to exercise a
civil remedy under section 1964, but this option has been selected infrequently. See
note 21 supra.
187. See note 119 and accompanying text supra.
188. Altese and Cappetto are the cases which are cited to most often by the other
majority courts. See note 17 supra.
189. See notes 103-106 and 142 and accompanying text supra.
190. The Sutton court stated: "It requires no great insight to recognize that applying the statute in this fashion renders the 'enterprise' element of the crime wholly
redundant and transforms the statute into a simple proscription against 'patterns of
racketeering activity.' "605 F.2d at 265. See also note 142 and accompanying text
supra.
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court decided that such a reading created doubts about whether Congress intended the statute to be applied against racketeering "organizations" being conducted by way of racketeering activities.1 91
Another example of the majority's less than thorough analysis can
be seen in its investigation of legislative history. Although there is
nothing wrong with looking to the general purpose of the OCCA as an
indication of the intended purpose of RICO, the investigation would
appear to be incomplete without going further to look at what Congress specifically had to say about RICO. The Sutton and Moeller
courts examined RICO legislative history and decided that Congress
explicitly stated its intent to only reach infiltration of legitimate
business by racketeering activity.' 92 The majority position essentially
infers that Congress intended "enterprise" to include illegitimate
business based upon the broad goals of the OCCA. 193 It would seem
that a factor as important to statutory interpretation as legislative
history would be examined thoroughly enough so that mere inference
of congressional intent would not be necessary. From reading the
various opinions of both the majority and minority positions, it appears that the Sutton and Moeller courts have reached a conclusion
that, even if not an accurate assessment of RICO's purpose, is at least
based upon a more thorough analysis of the available evidence.
E.

Section 1964

An argument that Congress only intended to prohibit the infiltration of legitimate business can be found in the "public versus private"
cases194 and appears to be equally applicable to the "legitimate versus
illegitimate" issue. The argument is based upon section 1964,' 9 which
outlines the civil remedies available to the courts and to those injured
by section 1962 violations.
191.

The court stated:

Common sense, not to mention the first principle of statutory construction, leads
us to reject the government's reading and to seek a construction that gives some
content to each element of the crime set forth in the text. The plain meaning of
the words in context indicates that the reference to 'enterprise' was included to
denote an entity larger than, and conceptually distinct from, any 'pattern of
racketeering activity' through which the enterprise's 'affairs' might be conducted.
If the 'enterprise' element of the crime is to have independent meaning, but is still
to encompass 'criminal enterprises' as the government contends, then a 'criminal
enterprise' must involve something more than simply an individual or group
engaged in a pattern of racketeering activity.
605 F.2d. at 266.
192. See notes 169-173 and accompanying text supra. See also United States v. Sutton, 605 F.2d 260, 266-68 (6th Cir. 1979).
193. See notes 113-115 and accompanying text supra.
194. See notes 83 and 90 and accompanying text supra.
195. See note 83 supra.
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Under section 1964 the district courts may order a violator to divest
himself or herself of any interest obtained in the enterprise. They may
also restrict any future activities or investments relating to the enterprise or may reorganize or completely dissolve the enterprise. It seems
unlikely that Congress would take the time and effort to give the

courts jurisdiction to order the divestment of a narcotics dealer of his
or her interest in the narcotics ring. Divestiture implies that the
organization from which the violator is to be divested will continue. It
can be assumed that one of the purposes of divestiture is to protect the

remaining interests. The same can be said for prohibiting future investments in the enterprise. Dissolving or reorganizing the corrupted

enterprise, and "making due provision for the rights of innocent persons, ' ' 9 6 also lead to the conclusion that Congress only had legitimate

businesses in mind in fashioning remedies. 1 97
The purpose of section 1964 is apparently to prohibit future in-

fluence by racketeers and to reform the corrupted organization.
Arguably, the section indicates that Congress intended for RICO to be
applied against those illegal activities which infiltrate legitimate
businesses, thereby requiring the reorganization and reform of the cor-

rupted business.'

98

This interpretation of section 1964 is consistent

with the statements made by Congressmen concerning their understanding of RICO's purpose. 99
V.

CONCLUSION

The decisions which have attempted to resolve the question
whether the "enterprise" concept under RICO is limited to legitimate
business can be viewed from two different perspectives. Numerically,
the weight of authority is, at this time, overwhelmingly on the side of a
"liberal" RICO construction. The persuasiveness of authority,
196. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(a) (1976).
197. Noting the fact that the section 1964 remedies appear to be aimed at
legitimate business is not meant to imply that section 1964 precludes the possibility that
Congress could have intended illegitimate "organizations" to be encompassed by the
enterprise concept of sections 1961(4) and 1962. The purpose of noting this fact is to
further indicate that Congress apparently had the protection of legitimate business in
mind when it enacted RICO. The point is not that Congress could not have had
anything else in mind, but rather that there seems to be no evidence that it intended
anything else.
198. In Moeller, the court noted the reference to the RICO civil remedies by the
Senate Report: "These civil remedies, says the Report, are 'broad remedial provisions
for reform of corrupted organizations.' That comment can have reference only to a
legitimate business corrupted by racketeering money or activity." 402 F. Supp. at 59
(citations omitted).
199. See notes 169-173 and accompanying text supra.
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however, in terms of thorough and comprehensive investigation of
why Congress enacted RICO, appears to be with Moeller and Sutton.
The conclusion reached by the majority position appears to rest
ultimately upon the determination that nothing in the statutory
language of RICO or in its legislative history prohibits reading section
1962 as proscribing racketeering organizations. The Sutton and
Moeller courts took what appears to be a more positive approach to
the statute by basing their decisions upon evidence of the reading Congress intended, rather than the reading Congress failed to foreclose.
The controversy created by the Sutton decision will likely be resolved in one of two ways. Upon rehearing en banc, the Sixth Circuit
may align itself with the position taken by the other circuits and the
authority split will, at least temporarily, disappear. Should the Sixth
Circuit again hold that a RICO "enterprise" must be a legitimate
business, the resulting conflict will probably be resolved at some point
by the Supreme Court.
A less likely, but perhaps preferable means of resolution is a congressional effort to rewrite RICO so that no conflict would exist between one facial reading supported by OCCA legislative history on one
side and another facial reading supported by RICO legislative history
on the other.
Gale S. Finley
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